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1.  Introduction 
 
To address the public health issues related to the link between food consumption and chronic 
diseases, policy makers in many countries have taken action to change consumers’ behaviour 
by providing better information about food. Nutritional labelling is a crucial example of this 
type of information. Disclosure of the nutritional characteristics of most packaged foods 
became mandatory in the United States with the implementation of the Nutrition Labelling 
and Education Act (NLEA) in 1994. Under the NLEA regulations, a ‘Nutrition Facts’ panel 
on the product’s package must display information on nutrients such as calories, total and 
saturated fat, cholesterol, and sodium in a standardised format. In the EU, labelling remains 
voluntary, and nutritional labelling is mandatory only if nutrition and health claims appear on 
the food product’s packaging (Council Directive 90/496/EEC and Commission Directive 
2003/120/EC)).  
 
The extent of voluntary labelling varies between food sectors and countries in Europe. The 
“Flabel project” (Storcksdieck et al., 2010) audited 37,000 products from five food and 
beverage categories and found that 85% of the products provided back-of-pack (BOP) 
nutritional labelling (with values for specific countries ranging from 70% in Slovenia to 97% 
in Ireland), whereas 48% provided front-of-pack (FOP) information (ranging from 24% in 
Turkey to 82% in the UK). In France, nutritional labelling is quite common (87% of items), 
and the extent of nutritional labelling on packaging varies from 52% for jams to 99% for 
breakfast cereals
1. However, the type of labelling varies greatly, from simple nutritional facts 
to detailed labels that include nutritional guidelines and consumption advice. Very 
heterogeneous label formats are used in practice leading to many discussions at the European 
and national levels. In this context, new labelling rules could be implemented in the 





Several issues are relevant to the prospect of the need of new labelling regulations. The first is 
related to the effects of nutritional labelling on consumer behaviour. The second is related to 
its effects on the behaviour of food processors and their incentive to increase the nutritional 
quality of the food supply. The third issue is related to the feasibility of achieving full 
disclosure of reliable information to all consumers. 
 
On the consumer side, the influence of information policies on consumer behaviour has been 
extensively studied. A very broad body of literature deals with the responses of consumers to 
food nutrition labels and examines their knowledge and attitudes towards nutritional labelling 
(see Drichoutis et al. (2009b), Nayga (2008), Cowburn and Stockley (2005) and Grunert and 
Wills (2007) for literature reviews). The use of nutritional information on food labels and 
consumers’ comprehension of this information have been investigated in several papers. For 
instance, Grunert et al. (2010 found in the UK that consumer comprehension is high, with up 
to 87.5% of respondents being able to identify the healthiest product. Differences between 
levels of label use are mainly related to interest in healthy eating, whereas the comprehension 
of nutritional information on food labels is mainly related to nutrition knowledge. Both are in 
turn affected by demographic variables. Other studies have dealt with the impacts of 
nutritional labelling on purchase decisions, nutrient intake and the nutritional quality of the 
diet (Drichoutis et al., 2009a; Loureiro et al., 2006; Kim et al., 2000; Mojduszka et al., 1999; 
Pietinen et al., 2008; Nayga, 2008; Variyam, 2008). Although the impacts sometimes seem to 
be modest, nutritional labelling results in a healthier diet and reduces, at least for a subset of 
consumers, caloric intake from total and saturated fat as well as the intake of cholesterol and 
sodium. 
  
The labelling format and the quantity and type of information needed on the package to 
improve consumers’ choices are important issues. Several papers have compared the effects 
of the traditional nutrition facts panel on consumer choice with those of other front-of-pack 
(FOP) labelling options such as traffic lights (TLs), guidelines of daily amount (GDA) (Kelly 
et al., 2009; Larsson et al., 1999; Feunekes et al., 2008; Borgmeier and Westenhoefer, 2009; 
Andrews et al., 2011; Van Kleef et al., 2008). Teisl et al. (2001) discuss the trade-off between 
the cost of information acquisition and information accuracy, and they address the optimum 
levels of simplicity and detail in the information provided on the label. To deal with the 
dilemma that too much information can confuse consumers and too little information can 4 
 
mislead them, Wansink (2003) examined the effectiveness of various FOP health claims when 
used in combination with a full health claim on the back of the package. The results indicate 
that combining brief health claims on the front of a package with full health claims on the 
back of the package leads consumers to more fully process and believe the claim. The basic 
finding is that using two sides of a package (short claim on front; long claim on back) 
increases the believability of health claims. However, Andrews et al. (2011) wonder if simpler 
is always better. Studying the impact of the “Smart Choice” logo in the US, they find that this 
icon can lead to positive (and potentially misleading) evaluations of a product's healthfulness 
and nutritional value when compared to the TL-GDA icon or a control with no FOP icon. In 
this case, they find that nutritional awareness is more likely to moderate effects based on the 
Nutrition Facts Panel than on the FOP nutrition icon information.  
 
Concerning the second issue related to the supply side, it is important to note that even if not 
all consumers modify their behaviour, labelling can influence the decisions of food processors 
and thereby benefit public health due to an improvement in the quality of processed foods. 
The relationship between labelling and the quality of the food supply has received less 
attention in the literature. However, nutrition labelling policies may have significant effects 
on firms’ product reformulation and new product design strategies. These effects may derive 
from the need to preserve brand image or from the fact that labelling rules focus competition 
on nutrition. 
 
In the US, several studies have focused on the introduction of mandatory nutrition labels that 
disclose calories, fat, sugars, and salt, and they have shown that these policies provide 
incentives for the food industry to reformulate products (Ippolito and Mathios, 1990; 
Mojduszka et al., 1999; Caswell and Modjuska, 1996). More recently, Unnevehr and 
Jagmanaite (2008) studied the effects of regulations requiring the disclosure of the trans fat 
acids (TFA) content on nutrition labels. They showed that this information policy led to 
significant product reformulation by the food industry. Similarly, Vyth et al. (2009) and Vyth 
et al. (2010) in the Netherlands investigated the effects of a nutrition logo on the development 
of healthier products by food manufacturers. They show that FOP nutrition labels encourage 
companies to reformulate existing products and develop new ones with healthier ingredients, 
especially where sodium and dietary fiber are concerned. In Canada, Ricciuto et al. (2008) 
examined the effects of labelling regulations on the fat composition and price of margarine. 
They showed that reductions in TFA in margarine were implemented when new labelling 5 
 
regulations came into effect. However, the modifications were primarily made to the higher 
priced segments. The results suggest that voluntary labelling approaches result in minimal 
changes to the TFA content of low-cost products and thus may be of limited benefit to lower-
income groups, who are at higher risk of heart disease. 
 
The third important issue in the debate on labelling regulation is whether market forces result 
in the full disclosure of quality information to all consumers and lead to modifications that do 
not limit the consumption of healthier products to higher-income consumers. If so, 
government regulation of nutrition labelling would not be necessary: this solution places the 
fewest constraints on manufacturers while providing full and accurate information to 
consumers (Caswell et al., 2003). However, product quality signalling problems related to the 
reliability and consistency of information may lead to mandatory labelling. 
 
A broad body of theoretical literature deals with information disclosure, product quality 
signalling and public policy options in the event of market failure (see Kirmani and Rao 
(2000) for a synthetic presentation). When applied to nutritional issues, signal theory provides 
an interesting framework for the debate on mandatory versus voluntary labelling (Caswell and 
Mojduska, 1996). Generally speaking, voluntary labelling policy is based on the following 
two assumptions: 
 
(i)  Firms that market the highest quality products have an incentive to inform 
consumers that their products are really better than others: thus, they label their 
products even if labelling is not mandatory. Other firms have no incentive to label 
their products because their quality is lower. 
(ii)  Even if there are no labels on the lowest quality products, the previous observation 
leads consumers to infer that non-labelled products are of lower quality.  
 
If the assumptions (i) and (ii) are confirmed, mandatory labelling is not necessary because 
each consumer can assess the nutritional quality of each product even if not all products are 
labelled. If (i) and (ii) are not true, consumers face an information asymmetry problem 
because they cannot infer the quality of all the products from the quality of the voluntarily 
labelled products. This failure leads public health regulators to consider a second issue related 
to the product's prices. If labelled products are not more expensive than non-labelled products, 
there are no extra costs imposed by the labelling; in that case, mandatory labelling is required 6 
 
because the general application of nutritional labelling will not induce higher prices. If 
labelled products are more expensive than non-labelled products, there are two possibilities:  
 
-  The higher prices are due to extra costs (e.g., packaging costs and analytical costs) 
imposed by the labelling (see European Advisory Service (2004) for a survey on this 
issue). In this case, the generalisation of nutritional labelling through mandatory rules 
may result in the exclusion of some producers from the market, an increase in prices 
and/or the reinforcement of market concentration (Moorman, 1998). The benefits of 
better product information through mandatory labelling must be balanced with the risk 
of increased prices. 
 
-  There are no extra costs imposed by labelling. Thus, voluntary labelling is used 
mainly for discrimination of consumers: labelling is used to provide additional 
information on the product's characteristics to more health-sensitive consumers with 
greater willingness to pay regardless of the nutritional quality of the product. In this 
case, mandatory labelling is required. 
 
Relying on this theoretical framework, Mojduszka and Caswell (2000) discussed the 
effectiveness and the benefits of implementing mandatory nutrition labelling in the US. They 
studied the effectiveness of markets at providing information to consumers on the nutritional 
quality of processed food. Their results indicated that a mandatory system would benefit the 
food products market because it would increase the amount of information on nutrition 
available to consumers. 
 
The goal of our research is similar to that of Mojduszka and Caswell’s (2000) work because 
we aim to analyse the current development of nutritional labelling in France, and particularly 
the relation between labelling, product quality and price, to obtain some insight into whether 
mandatory nutritional labelling should be implemented. We distinguish several levels of 
information available on food packages, from no or simple nutritional panels to detailed 
nutritional panels with FOP information and consumption advice. We estimate the effects of 
nutrient content, brand and product category on the probability of adopting each type of label. 
We also investigate the effects of labelling adoption on prices. At this step, we focus on a 
specific sector, which is the biscuits and cakes sector in France. Our paper is also close to Van 
Camp et al.’s study (2010a and b), in which the authors examine the adoption of FOP 7 
 
schemes by the UK and assess the likelihood of the use of various “levels” of FOP labelling 
as a function of food category, retailer/manufacturer brand, and nutritional attributes.  
 
In the following section, we present the methods and the data. In the third section, we present 
the estimation results and discuss them in relation to the debate on voluntary versus 
mandatory labelling. In the last section, we mention the limits of the study and suggest some 
approaches to address them in further research. 
 
 
2.  Methodology and Data  
 
Following Modjuszka and Caswell (2000), we consider here that the nutritional quality of a 
food product can be expressed in terms of the amounts of the various nutrients contained by 
the product. Large amounts of desirable nutrients (e.g., dietary fiber) in a product indicate 
high nutritional quality, whereas large amounts of undesirable nutrients (e.g., fat, sodium) 
indicate low nutritive value
2.  
 
European directives make nutritional labelling on packaging optional but impose a format 
when it is provided. Information must be given in the form of either “group 1” (calories, 
protein, carbohydrates and fat) or “group 2” (the same plus sugars, saturated fat, dietary fiber 
and sodium) labels. When a nutritional claim is made for sugars, saturated fat, dietary fiber or 
sodium, the use of a group 2 label is mandatory. Nutrition labelling may also include the 
amounts of other nutrients such as saturated fat (for group 1), trans fats, starch, vitamins and 
minerals (for groups 1 and 2). In these cases, group 1 becomes “group 1+” and group 2 
becomes “group 2+”.  
 
Drichoutis at al. (2011) distinguish three types of information: nutritional labels or fact 
panels, health claims (e.g., “plant sterols reduce blood cholesterol”), and nutritional claims 
(e.g., fat free, low calorie). In this paper, we distinguish the following: 
 
-  nutrition fact panels, which list nutrients in the various formats described above; 
-  claims based on nutritional or health issues; 
                                                            
2	A more accurate approach of nutrition quality of foods would be preferable, for instance by using nutrient 
profiles. It was not possible to set up such an approach in this study.	8 
 
-  other information relevant to consumption recommendations (e.g., recommended 
serving size, recommended accompaniment). 
 
We assume that it is possible to create a gradient characterising the level of information 
provided to consumers on the basis of the following: 
 
-  the presence/absence of a claim; 
-  the presence/absence of nutrition fact panels and their level of detail; 
-  the presence/absence and position on the package of additional information allowing 
consumers to assess the product’s contribution to daily intake and/or the need to 
increase or limit the consumption of the product for health reasons. 
 
Given the European regulation framework, firms must implement labelling with two 
considerations in mind. The first is related to nutrition and health claims. Before their use on a 
food item package, such claims must be accepted by the public authorities: indeed, processors 
must prove that the nutrient content on which the claim is made is below or above some 
publicly defined threshold. If the claim is allowed, processors are obliged to label the product 
and put a nutrition fact panel on the package. They can voluntarily add information such as 
recommended serving size, consumption guidelines, and other FOP and/or BOP information.  
 
To analyze the characteristics of products with nutrition or health claims, we assume that the 
presence/absence of such claims on the package is a function of multiple product variables, 
including its nutrient content, its type of brand, its product category and other information 
available on the package. Because the dependent variable is the firm’s choice and is therefore 
discrete, the logit model is used in this study. 
 
If the product is marketed without nutrition or health claims, nutritional labelling is not yet 
mandatory. In this case, processors may use no label or several types of labels, from simple to 
more detailed. They can also decide to provide additional information such as FOP and/or 
BOP information related to calories or nutrients, consumption guidelines, and a recommended 
serving size. To deal with the variability in the choice of nutritional labelling used on food 
items (from no or limited information to extensive information), we assume that the type of 
nutritional label is a function of various product variables such as nutrient content, type of 9 
 
brand, product category and extra information provided on the package. To exploit the ranked 
and multinomial features of the dependent variable, we use an ordered logit model. 
 
In the following, we present two empirical procedures, the logit and ordered logit models 




We start by the binary logit model supposing that an observed variable     can take a value of 
only 0 or 1. For example,     is 1 if a nutrition or health claim is used on a product’s package 
and 0 otherwise.  It can be written as 
 




∗  0																																																																	 1                         
where 
  
∗          																																																																	 2  
 
for i= 1, 2…, N.   
∗ is an unobserved variable called latent variable,   	is a row vector of 
explanatory variables (e.g., nutrient content, type of brand…), β is a column vector of 
unknown parameters and    is an error term. A model that correlates a binomial dependent 
variable with explanatory variables can be constructed as 
Pr      1 /      	Pr   
∗  0 /    P r          /               
Assuming the cumulative distribution function F is logistic, the empirical specification is 
defined as 
Pr      1 /       
    
1       
The binary logit model is estimated by the Maximum Likelihood method using the logit 
command of the Stata software. To interpret the effects of the explanatory variables, it is 
usual to consider the odds ratio defined as 
 10 
 
Pr      1 /     
Pr      0 /     
 
 
To explain the firm’s choice of the type of nutritional label between no labelling and labels 
with extensive information, we estimated an ordered logit model also known as the 
proportional odds model. This model is a generalisation of the binary logit model that allows 
more than two outcomes, which can be ranked. In this case, (1) can be modified to be 
 
       
1	if	       
∗     
									 	if	         
∗     	for	
		 	if	         
∗     
  2 ,…,  1  
where    to    are unobserved thresholds and   
∗ is a latent variable defined as in (2). In this 
study,     is 1 if no labeling or low information label is used on a product package and J if the 
highest information label is used. Because the boundary values of the latent variable are 
unknown, one can simply set       ∞  and       ∞ . The model is constructed as 
Pr        /      Pr                      
Pr        /      	                          
where 
	             
       
1          
The ordered logit model is estimated by the Maximum Likelihood method using the ologit 
command of the Stata software. Similarly to the binary logit model, it is usual to consider the 
odds ratio to interpret the effects of the explanatory variables, defined as 
Pr        /     
Pr        /     
 
where 
Pr        /        P r         /     
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The odds ratio for each explanatory variable is equal to	        and they are defined by the 




The data used in this study are drawn from the Observatory of Food Quality (Oqali) database. 
The Oqali was created in 2008 by the French Ministries in charge of Food and Agriculture, 
Health, and Consumption. The goal was to set up an independent system of observation to 
assess the nutritional composition of food items marketed by all of the brands existing in the 
French market. As of 2011, the Oqali database contains about 20,000 items, covering the 
majority of processed food sectors and representing around 60% of the consumption of these 
types of food in France. Each product is described by several parameters including nutrient 
content (energy (calories), protein, total fat, saturated fat, total carbohydrates, sugars, dietary 
fiber and sodium), nutrition labelling, ingredient list, nutrition and health claims, 
recommended serving size, nutrition and consumption guidelines used on the package and the 
type of brand. The market share and the mean price of each food item are assessed by 
matching the Oqali database with data provided by the TNS Kantar panel, which records food 
purchases made by representative households in France during the year in progress.  
 
In this study, we focus on the biscuits and cakes sector in 2008. This sector is important from 
a public health point of view because these products’ contribution to carbohydrate intake 
ranges from 2.9% in adults to 4.5% in children, and they provide 2.1% of the daily fat intake 
for adults and 4.7% for children. It is important to note that biscuits and cakes are mostly 
consumed for hedonic reasons. For consumers, this can be an apparent contradiction with the 
nutritional aspect of the products.  
 
A sample of 806 biscuit and cake items is used to estimate the binary logit model to explain 
the choice to market a food product with a nutritional or health claim (model 1). After 
deleting observations with claims, we consider a sample of 642 observations related to the 
ordered logit model used to estimate the voluntary choice of a nutritional label without health 
or nutritional claims (model 2).  
The endogenous variable introduced in model 1 is an indicator of the use of a health or 
nutritional claim on the food package; it is coded as 1 if at least one nutritional or 12 
 
health claim is used on the package and 0 if not. Several categories of explanatory 
variables are selected to explain this endogenous variable. The first is the nutritional 
quality of the food product, which is captured by 5 continuous variables that measure 
the food’s nutrient content in terms of energy (calories), sugars, saturated fat, dietary 
fiber and sodium. Except in the case of calories, which are expressed in kcal/100 g, the 
other nutrients are expressed in g/100 g of food. Three dummy variables are used to 
categorise the product’s brand as a national brand, a private label or a hard-discount 
brand. Additional variables are introduced to describe extra information used on the 
package and its location on the package (see the appendix 1 for illustrations of the 
various components of nutritional information on packaging). We consider 2 types of 
extra labels: daily amount guideline (GDA) and traffic lights (TL); we also consider 
information in two locations on the package: on the front of the package (FOP) and on 
its side and/or back (BOP) only. Three combinations are found in the data used: GDA 
on FOP; GDA only on BOP;  TL only on BOP; and no GDA or TL, resulting in four 
dummy variables. Two dummy variables are used to describe available nutritional 
information concerning recommended serving size or consumption advice (for 
example, “serve yoghurt and fresh fruit with 3 cookies”). A dummy variable indicates 
the use of an organic or fair trade label. Finally, 7 dummy product category variables 
indicate if the product is plain, fruit or chocolate biscuits; plain, fruit or chocolate 
cakes; or another category. 
 
The endogenous variable introduced in model 2 is an ordered indicator of the type of 
nutritional label used on packages without nutrition or health claims (see the appendix 1). 
More precisely, we define a gradient of information from low to high informational content as 
follows: 
 
-  “Gradient 1” : no labelling or groups 1 and 1+ as described above, 
-  “Gradient 2” corresponds to group 2 and group 2+, 
-  “Gradient 3” combines the information in gradient 2 with extra labels (GDA or TL) 
located only on the side and/or back of the package, 
-  “Gradient 4” combines the information in gradient 2 with extra labels (GDA or TL) 
located on the FOP. 
 13 
 
Except the extra labels (GDA or TL) which are included in the definition of the dependant 
variable, the same set of explanatory variables used in model 1 is introduced in model 2. 
Moreover, to refine the explanation of the type of brand, the 3 dummy variables are broken 
down into 9 dummies: 3 types of national brands, 5 types of private labels and 1 grouping all 
hard-discount brands. Definitions and samples statistics of all variables are presented in Table 
1. 
 
  14 
 
 
Mean SD Mean SD
Nutrition or health claims 0,213 0,410
Gradient 1 to 4 2,412 1,136
Nutrient content
Energy (kcal/100g) 454,689 52,658 461,011 52,837
Sugars (g/100g) 32,869 9,022 33,730 8,484
Saturated fat (g/100g) 9,695 5,452 10,578 5,579
Dietary fiber (g/100g) 3,039 1,854 2,549 1,356
Sodium (g/100g) 0,252 0,140 0,252 0,144
Type of brand
National brands 0,294 0,456 0,251 0,434
. National brand 1 0,158 0,365
. National brand 2 0,022 0,146
. Other national brands 0,077 0,267
Private labels 0,520 0,500 0,573 0,495
. Private label 1 0,147 0,354
. Private label 2 0,119 0,324
. Private label 3 0,090 0,286
. Private label 4 0,070 0,255
. Other private label brands 0,147 0,354
Hard-discount brands 0,186 0,389 0,176 0,382
Additional information
GDA FOP 0,218 0,413
GDA BOP 0,103 0,304
TL BOP 0,094 0,292
No GDA or TL 0,584 0,493
Consumption advice
Recommended serving size 0,769 0,422 0,732 0,443
Recommended accompaniment 0,194 0,395 0,167 0,373
Organic or fair trade label 0,055 0,227 0,051 0,220
Category of products
Plain biscuits 0,125 0,331 0,147 0,354
Fruit biscuits 0,134 0,341 0,101 0,301
Chocolate biscuits 0,412 0,492 0,407 0,492
Plain cakes 0,038 0,192 0,050 0,217
Fruit cakes 0,041 0,198 0,045 0,207
Chocolate cakes 0,105 0,307 0,125 0,331
Other category 0,144 0,351 0,125 0,331
* All dummy variables are coded 0-1 where 1 indicates a positive outcome. For example, 
Nutrition or health claims=1 if at least 1 claim is used on the food package.






806 obs. 642 obs.15 
 
 
3.  Results 
 
a.  Labelling and nutrition claims 
 
As mentioned above, nutritional labelling is mandatory when a nutrition or health claim is 
placed on a package. For this reason, it is interesting to identify the main differences between 
products with and without claims. Note that in the biscuits and cakes sector, nutrition and 
health claims are reported for about 21% of the products. 
 
Table 2 presents the results of the binary logit model used to compare products with and 
without claims. In this table, an odds ratio greater (less) than 1 means that an increase in the 
continuous explanatory variable increases (decreases) the probability of a nutritional or health 
claim. Similarly, an odds ratio greater (less) than 1 means that the positive outcome of a 
dummy explanatory variable increases (decreases) the probability of a claim. 
 
We test several set of explanatory variables. In column 1, we take into account the nutrient 
content, the type of brand and the products categories. In column 2, we add the nutritional 
information (GDA or TL on the FOP and the BOP). In column 3, we add the consumption 
advice and the organic or fair trade labels. 
 
If we consider the nutrients listed on the labels, it appears that the products with nutritional 
claims are of better nutritional quality: the odds ratios are smaller than 1 for sugars and 
saturated fat and greater than 1 for the dietary fiber. It means that a lower level of saturated fat 
and carbohydrates and a higher level of dietary fiber increase the probability of a claim. This 
quality effect is interesting because the main nutritional claims used in the biscuits sector are 
not necessarily related to these nutrients. Indeed, more than half of the claims used in this 
sector are related to vitamins and minerals. The strongest effect is observed for dietary fiber 
content, which seems to play a major role in this sector. We will comment on this point later. 
 
We also note that the product's category does not play an important role in whether its 
package contains a claim, and in general, the presence of a claim is not dependent on the 







Energy (kcal/100g) 1,005 1,004 1,003
Sugars (g/100g) 0,933 *** 0,933 *** 0,939 ***
Saturated fat (g/100g) 0,713 *** 0,719 *** 0,731 ***
Dietary fiber (g/100g) 1,704 *** 1,723 *** 1,698 ***
Sodium (g/100g) 0,583 0,534 1,441
Type of brand
National brands 2,634 *** 2,222 ** 0,896
Private labels 0,565 ** 0,663 0,303 ***
Hard-discount brands omitted omitted omitted
Additional information
GDA FOP 0,706 0,499 *
GDA BOP 0,413 * 0,294 **
TL BOP 0,356 * 0,192 ***
No GDA or TL omitted omitted
Consumption advice
Recommended serving size 5,799 ***
Recommended accompaniment 2,280 **
Organic or fair trade label 3,108 **
Category of products
Plain biscuits 2,237 2,614 1,602
Fruit biscuits 14,750 * 16,045 * 11,059 *
Chocolate biscuits 6,562 6,621 4,894
Plain cakes omitted omitted omitted
Fruit cakes 1,867 1,973 1,245
Chocolate cakes 0,850 0,925 0,637
Other category 10,393 10,689 6,970
Pseudo R
2 0,417 0,424 0,460
Log pseudo likelihood -243,84 -240,52 -225,54
% of correctly predicted 87,5 87,3 88,0
Note: Asterisks indicate levels of significance:***= 1%; **= 5%; *= 10%.
Odds ratio
(1) (2) (3)
Table 2. Maximum-Likelihood estimates of the binary logit model on the choice of 
marketing a food product with nutrition or health claims (model 1)
Nutrition or health claims
Odds ratio Odds ratio17 
 
More interestingly, the probability of the presence of a nutritional claim is influenced by the 
type of brand: positively for national brands in columns 1 and 2 and negatively for private 
labels in columns 1 and 3. The development of nutritional claims is therefore due more to the 
strategies of the food processors than those of the retailers.  
 
We only consider the non-mandatory nutritional information available on packages. It appears 
that the presence of additional information like GDA or TL on the FOP, as well as on the 
BOP, decreases the probability of the presence of a claim. Conversely, other information 
increases the probability of a claim: recommended accompaniments and serving sizes are 
likely to be associated with claims. Similarly, the presence of an organic or fair trade label is 
positively associated with the presence of a claim. 
 
b.  Labelling of products without nutritional claims 
 
In the absence of a nutritional claim, product labelling is voluntary. The decision to label the 
product or not and the choice of the label format are interesting factors to analyse for the 
products without nutritional claims. Table 3 presents the results of the ordered logit used to 
assess the effects of a set of explanatory variables on the probability of having a label from 
one of the four labelling categories that we defined in the previous section. In Table 3, an 
odds ratio smaller than 1 means that a larger value of the explanatory variable is more likely 
to be observed in the first type of labelling (gradient 1: no label or group 1 label) and least 
likely to be observed in the last type of labelling (gradient 4: group 2 label + FOP logos); an 
odds ratio greater than 1 means that a greater value of the variable is more likely to be 
observed in the last type of labelling and least likely to be observed in the first type of 
labelling. 
 
We test several set of explanatory variables. In column 1, we take into account the nutrient 
content, the aggregated brands and the products categories. In column 2, we take into account 
the brands in a desegregated form (individual brands). In column 3, we add the consumption 
advice and the organic or fair trade labels. 




Energy (kcal/100g) 0,999 0,997 0,996
Sugars (g/100g) 1,003 1,001 1,001
Saturated fat (g/100g) 1,036 1,044 ** 1,054 **
Dietary fiber (g/100g) 1,149 ** 1,172 *** 1,161 **
Sodium (g/100g) 1,969 1,560 2,367
Type of brand
National brands 0,457 ***
. National brand 1 0,297 *** 0,076 ***
. National brand 2 0,225 *** 0,118 ***
. Other national brands 1,440 1,539
Private labels 3,907 ***
. Private label 1 4,891 *** 1,629
. Private label 2 2,433 *** 1,432
. Private label 3 4,820 *** 2,115 ***
. Private label 4 26,303 *** 12,024 ***
. Other private label brands 4,310 *** 2,077 **
Hard-discount brands omitted omitted omitted
Consumption advice
Recommended serving size 7,667 ***
Recommended accompaniment 1,788 **
Organic or fair trade label 0,779
Category of products
Plain biscuits 0,517 0,631 0,630
Fruit biscuits 0,575 0,672 0,723
Chocolate biscuits 0,605 0,668 0,618
Plain cakes omitted omitted omitted
Fruit cakes 0,618 0,731 0,724
Chocolate cakes 0,697 0,891 0,711
Other category 1,195 0,972 0,966
Pseudo R
2 0,094 0,126 0,189
Log pseudo likelihood -808,69 -780,13 -724,36
% of correctly predicted 41,3 50,0 50,0
Note: Asterisks indicate levels of significance:***= 1%; **= 5%; *= 10%.
(1) (2) (3)
Gradient 1 to 4
Table 3. Maximum-Likelihood estimates of the ordered logit model on the choice of 
the nutritional labelling from no or low information to high information (model 2)    
Odds ratio Odds ratio Odds ratio19 
 
It appears that a better nutritional quality does not increase the probability of the presence of a 
gradient 4 type of label. The values of the odds ratios for energy, sugars and sodium are not 
significant. However, an increase in the content of saturated fat increases the probability that 
the product’s label will provide more detailed nutritional information. A larger amount of 
dietary fiber increases also the probability that the product’s label will provide more detailed 
nutritional information.  
 
The product category does not influence the choice of label type: regardless of the type of 
biscuits, the values are not significant. The decision to label the product and the choice of 
label format are not dependent on the type of products. 
 
The package may provide additional information. We note that the presence of consumption 
recommendations (accompaniment and serving sizes) increases the probability of more 
detailed nutritional facts. Conversely, the presence of other labels (e.g., organic, fair trade) is 
not related to the presence of detailed nutritional labels. 
 
As previously, the main effect is obtained for the type of brand. With the aggregated brands 
the odds ratios are respectively smaller and greater than 1 for the national brands and the 
private labels. With disaggregated brands, the same effect is shown even if some 
heterogeneity appears in column 3 among the private labels. 
 
 
c.  Relationships between labelling, quality, and price 
 
As mentioned in the introduction, it is important to determine whether products with more 
detailed nutritional labelling are more expensive. Any observed price difference could be due 
to the following: 
 
-  higher labelling costs; 
-  higher production costs if the products with more detailed nutritional labelling are of 
better nutritional quality; 
-  consumer discrimination strategies used by firms if the more extensively labelled 




We did not introduce the price variable as an exogenous variable in the binary and the ordered 
logit models because of the risks of simultaneity bias. To address this difficulty, it would be 
necessary to estimate a simultaneous equation model with a binary or ordinal nutritional 
labelling variable and a continuous price variable. It was not possible to develop this model in 
this paper. It will be the goal of further research. However we identified a clear “brand effect” 
as the type of brand clearly influences the choice of the type of label. First, we noted that if 
the product is marketed through a national brand, the probability of observing a nutritional 
claim is greater, but the probability of observing extensive information on the packages 
(gradients 3 or 4) is lower. We noted also that if the product is marketed through a private 
label, the probability of observing a nutritional claim is lower, but the probability of observing 
detailed and FOP nutritional label is greater. As the national brands have on average higher 
prices than the private labels, it is important to better identify the price impact of these 
strategies.   
 
To obtain further insight into the relationships between labelling, quality, and price, we 
performed a hedonic price regression on two samples: one considering all of the products in 
the biscuits sector, and a second one with only the products without claims. The descriptive 
statistics and the results are given in appendix 2. The main results are the following. 
 
Nutrients have a positive effect on price, but in an unexpected way from a public health 
perspective: more energy, more fat, and more carbohydrates are associated with higher price. 
This finding could be due to higher production costs (Do more sugar or more fat in the biscuit 
increase the production costs?) or to the consumers’ WTP (Do they prefer fatty or sweet 
products?). Conversely, an increase in dietary fiber (which is in line with health 
recommendations) has a positive effect on price, but only when a claim is present.  
 
Finally, it is important to note that the type of label used does not influence the price of 
products either with or without claims. On the opposite, the presence of a claim has a positive 







d.  Signalling and information disclosure 
 
Our goal was to assess, for the biscuits sector in France, the market’s effectiveness at 
providing information to consumers on the nutritional quality of processed foods.  
 
We quantified the nutritional quality of food products by measuring their nutritional 
characteristics. We estimated the effect of these nutritional characteristics on the probability 
of voluntary disclosure by considering several types of labels, from no or very simple labels 
to detailed nutrition fact panels including additional information on the FOP.  
 
The current European situation is complex because nutritional labelling is either mandatory or 
voluntary depending on the presence or absence of nutritional claims. Across all products, it 
appears that those with claims have the required nutrition fact panels and are of better 
nutritional composition than other products. However, generally speaking, neither GDA nor 
TL logos are used, even on the FOP. Thus, nutritional claims seem to be the main method of 
informing the consumer about the product’s quality.  
 
If we now consider food items without claims, it appears that voluntary signalling does not 
work perfectly. If the data supported effective quality signalling, the estimated odds ratios of 
undesirable nutrients would be lower than 1 showing that the higher their levels in a food, the 
lower the probability of a detailed nutrition information label being present. The estimated 
odds ratios of desirable nutrients such as fiber would be positive because it would be in the 
manufacturer’s interest to disclose information about the high nutritional quality of their 
brands. In fact, we show that the voluntary disclosure of nutritional content by food 
companies does not result in reliable and consistent quality signals to consumers. Indeed, if 
we look at calories, sodium, sugars and fat, lower nutrient contents do not increase the 
probability to observe more nutritional  information on the package. Moreover the content in 
saturated fat seems to be higher where more detailed nutritional information is provided on 
the package. An exception is dietary fiber content, which increases with more detailed 
nutritional information. Despite this exception, it is likely that consumers cannot infer from 
the absence or the presence of more nutritional information on the package the quality of the 
products available on the market.  
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e.  Labelling and firms’ strategies 
 
What is the role of nutritional labelling in stakeholders’ strategies (see Figure 1)?  
 
On the one hand, processors respond to nutritional issues mainly through product innovation 
and by marketing products using nutritional claims. Because these products incur additional 
R&D and processing costs and because the targeted consumers may have a higher WTP for 
claims, these products are marketed with higher prices. Processing firms clearly use 
nutritional claims for vertical differentiation strategies within the biscuit sector. More detailed 
labelling than the level required by the nutritional claim regulations seems not to be an 
important issue for national brands. One can assume that consumers’ WTP is more likely 
determined by the presence of a claim combined with certain other labels (organic or others) 
rather than by GDA or TL logos, even on the FOP. Consumption and accompaniment 
recommendations on the package may reinforce the WTP of targeted consumers, but it seems 
that the FOP information conveyed through GDA or TL logos does not play a role, at least for 
these brands, in the vertical differentiation of these products.  
 
On the other hand, retailers respond with more detailed labelling through GDA and TL logos 
on the FOP, which do not impact price and are not clearly related to the nutritional quality of 
the food. One can assume that consumers’ WTP for food items with more detailed nutritional 
labelling on the package is weak when these labels are not associated with claims.  
 
Why then do retailers implement such nutritional labelling strategies? Two answers may be 
relevant: 
 
-  First, under pressure from public regulators and consumer associations, retailers may 
implement these strategies to demonstrate their corporate social responsibility. 
  
-  Second, one may assume that these strategies are used to compete with national brands 
using nutritional claims. Providing abundant nutritional information on the package 
and setting prices lower than those of products that make nutrition claims may limit 
consumers’ tendency to switch to products with nutritional claims. In that sense, these 









4.  Conclusion 
 
Given the current public regulations and the extent of labelling in France, we analysed 
determinants of adopting a detailed nutritional information label and its relation to quality and 
price. It appears that consumers can only distinguish lower and higher quality products 
through nutritional claims, but they cannot infer the product quality from the presence or 
absence of extensive information on the package: detailed nutrition fact panels, GDAs or TL 
logos on the FOP do not signal higher quality products. 
 
Unlike Van Camp et al.’s (2010) study in the UK, we considered it was necessary to 
distinguish products with nutrition and health claims (for which labelling is mandatory) from 
other products (for which labelling is still voluntary). In doing so, we confirm that the 
labelling decision is clearly related to brand strategies, but in a different way for national 




















It has been shown that national brands are involved in the development of nutrition and health 
claims, but they do not frequently use detailed nutritional information, like GDAs or TLs on 
the BOP or the FOP. These claims are tools for implementing vertical differentiation 
strategies, which are sometimes complemented by the use of other quality signals such as 
organic and fair trade labels. In contrast, for private labels, detailed GDAs and additional FOP 
information seem to be widely used either for corporate social responsibility reasons or to 
compete with national brands. These labelling strategies have no impact on either price or 
nutritional quality, but they may limit the market share extension of products with nutritional 
claims.  
 
Our study clearly has some limitations. We studied only one food sector, and it will be 
necessary to examine other sectors in order to confirm our conclusions. To go further in the 
analysis, it will be interesting to develop a simultaneous equation model of the relationship 
between labelling and price.  
 
 
It will also be important to study the impacts of the strategies we identified on consumers’ 
purchase decisions. Such a study is possible because our database on food characteristics 
(nutrients and label descriptions) is matched with a consumption database that lists prices, 
market shares and households’ socio-demographic characteristics. 
 
Our analysis suggests that it is important to consider the role of labelling in competition 
within the food sector. At equilibrium, the use of nutritional labelling and its impacts on 
consumption and health depend not only on consumers’ reactions to the information provided 
on the package but also on the way firms use nutritional labelling in the competition between 
brands. Is the situation analysed here a market equilibrium? In other words, given the 
additional costs of producing higher nutritional quality and given consumers’ WTP for better 
nutritional quality on the one hand and additional information on the other hand, is the 
adoption of nutritional labels by firms and the market shares of the various types of products 
(e.g., with and without claims, with and without a detailed FOP GDA) stable? Will new type 
of firms adapt their nutritional information strategies? How would mandatory nutritional 
labelling modify this equilibrium and what would the consequences be for price, quality and 
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Gradient 4 (with GDA on FOP) 




The hedonic price method is a useful approach to studying the price-quality relationship for a 
product. The method amounts to a (possibly nonlinear) regression analysis of price on the 
characteristics of the product. The implicit price of a characteristic is defined as the derivative 
of the price with respect to the product's attributes. Rosen (1974) has shown under which 
market conditions that the implicit price can be interpreted as the value consumers place on an 
additional unit of the characteristic. If the estimated implicit price turns out not to be 
significantly different from zero, then the characteristic is not valued by consumers, or the 
characteristic is not considered important or relevant in connection with the product. The 
limits of this method are, however, well known. We use it here for a first approach to 
understanding the relationship between labeling, quality, and price. 
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Mean SD Mean SD Coeff. Coeff.
Price (€/kg) 6,658 3,579 6,362 3,452
Nutrient content
Energy (kcal/100g) 454,864 53,041 460,432 52,948 0,020 *** 0,023 ***
Sugars (g/100g) 32,892 8,922 33,663 8,422 0,108 *** 0,087 ***
Saturated fat (g/100g) 9,689 5,461 10,502 5,547 0,093 *** 0,064 **
Dietary fiber (g/100g) 2,972 1,749 2,530 1,312 0,263 *** 0,076
Sodium (g/100g) 0,252 0,142 0,252 0,144 1,020 -0,242
Nutritional labelling
Gradient 1 0,266 0,442 0,302 0,460 omitted omitted
Gradient 2 0,309 0,463 0,250 0,433 0,379 0,420
Gradient 3 0,213 0,410 0,224 0,417 -0,088 0,301
Gradient 4 0,212 0,409 0,224 0,417 -0,460 -0,115
Nutrition or health claims 0,193 0,395 0,902 **
Type of brand
National brands 0,312 0,464 0,266 0,442 3,743 *** 4,222 ***
Private labels 0,534 0,499 0,584 0,493 0,210 0,026
Hard-discount brands
0,153 0,361 0,150 0,357 omitted omitted
Consumption information
Recommended serving size 0,772 0,420 0,732 0,443 0,642 ** 0,472
Recommended accomp. 0,196 0,397 0,163 0,369 -0,094 0,836 ***
Organic or fair trade label 0,053 0,223 0,047 0,212 3,660 *** 3,917 ***
Category of products
Plain biscuits 0,140 0,347 0,157 0,364 -0,673 -0,696
Fruit biscuits 0,131 0,338 0,101 0,302 -1,653 *** -1,268 **
Chocolate biscuits 0,394 0,489 0,394 0,489 1,771 *** 1,125 **
Plain cakes 0,041 0,198 0,051 0,219 omitted omitted
Fruit cakes 0,045 0,208 0,047 0,212 2,364 *** 1,757 ***
Chocolate cakes 0,105 0,307 0,125 0,331 0,929 * 0,530
Other category 0,143 0,350 0,125 0,331 0,043 0,387
Intercept -9,919 *** -9,671 ***
R
2 0,465 0,498
Note: Asterisks indicate levels of significance:***= 1%; **= 5%; *= 10%.
Descriptive statistics and OLS estimates of the hedonic price function
685 obs. 553 obs.
Estimation results
Sample 
without 
claims
All Sample
Sample without 
claims
All Sample
Descriptive statistics